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CASES NOTED
UNIVERSITY REGULATION OF STUDENTS: AN
UNCOMPLETED EXERCISE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Florida State University allows only those student organizations
recognized by the University to use University buildings for meetings and
other non-University sponsored activities. A student organization' which
had been denied recognition occupied a university building for the purpose
of protesting this regulation. Upon application by the University, an ex
parte restraining order was secured2 and served on the students after
occupation had begun.
Two issues were raised at the contempt proceedings which were held
for the students who defied the court order. First, the sufficiency of the
showing of irreparable injury necessary for the issuance of a restraining
order was questioned. Secondly, the denial of the use of the University
building was said to constitute an infringement of the students' freedom
of speech. The trial court3 held for the University. The Florida Supreme
Court4 held, affirmed: It is within the domain of the University to regulate
the use of its buildings by student organizations. Lieberman v. Marshall,
236 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1970).
The instant case presents a situation in which the Florida Supreme
Court, in reviewing an interlocutory appeal, has upheld a contempt con-
viction after the defendants had violated an ex parte restraining order.
The defendants, by moving to dissolve the restraining order, preserved
the issue of the validity of the order for appellate review. The validity
of the contempt conviction, therefore, rested on the legality of the ex
parte restraining order. If the restraining order was invalid, either because
the order infringed constitutional guarantees or because the order was not
issued in compliance with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure5 the de-
fendant's motion to dissolve the order should have been granted.
The situation presented for appellate review was therefore different
from that in Walker v. City of Birmingham.6 In Walker, the defendants
had been the subject of an ex parte order restraining the holding of mass
1. The unrecognized organization in question was the campus chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society, the S.D.S.
2. J. Stanley Marshall as Acting President of the University secured the order.
3. Circuit Court of Leon County.
4. The action was an interlocutory appeal first taken to the First District Court of
Appeal, but transferred on appellees' motion, because constitutional questions involving the
first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and sections five and nine
of article I, Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution were involved. A final judgment
would be directly appealable to the Florida Supreme Court, and jurisdiction of the inter-
locutory appeal was therefore accepted. See Dade County v. Kelly, 149 So.2d 382 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1963).
No temporary injunction shall be granted except after notice to the adverse party
unless it is manifest from the allegations of a verified complaint or supporting
affidavits that the injury will be done if an immediate remedy is not afforded ....
Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.610(b).
6. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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street parades. The defendants violated the order without first seeking
judicial review of the order's validity. The parades staged in violation
of the ex parte order were held to be in violation of that order and the
contempt citations issued by the lower court were upheld. The four dis-
senting members of the Court in the Walker decision argued that an ex
parte order is a flagrant misuse of judicial procedure where first amend-
ment freedom of speech rights are involved.'
The restraining order in the instant case was read to the students
during their occupation of the University building. All students who con-
tinued to occupy the building after notice of the restraining order were
cited for contempt. Therefore, the legality of the ex parte restraining
order and the contempt citations may be determined by comparing the
facts in the instant case with the facts in the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Prin-
cess Anne.8 In Carroll, an ex parte restraining order was issued prohibit-
ing members of the defendant "white supremacy" organization from hold-
ing an outdoor meeting that had been scheduled for the day in question.
The court held the ex parte order invalid on the grounds that there had
been no formal or informal notice to the petitioners. An ex parte order
is not proper where no showing has been made that it was impossible
to serve or notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity
to participate in an adversary proceeding.
In the instant case, however, there was a showing by the University
that the restraining order was secured after occupation had begun, and
consequently no adversary hearing would have been possible. Regard-
less of how the procedural issue could or should have been resolved, the
Lieberman decision judicially sanctions the restraint which was placed
upon the defendants in the particular factual context in which the case
arose. The legality of that restraint must therefore be considered.
If this restraint violates the constitutional rights of the students the
restraining order would be invalid regardless of the fact that procedurally
it was properly obtained. The facts of the instant case indicate that the
Board of Regents of the University System of Florida and Florida State
University adopted the regulation requiring administrative recognition of
a student organization prior to the organization being permitted the use
of University buildings for rallies and other non-University sponsored
functions.' On its face, the regulation falls within permissible constitu-
tional limits. The state (or an agent of the state) is justified in the
limited, reasonable regulation of a fundamental freedom'" where the reg-
7. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 324 (1967).
8. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
9. Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So.2d 120, 124 (Fla. 1970).
10. See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969). See also
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), which invalidated a school regulation
forbidding the wearing of buttons, while in Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ.,
363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), the court held valid a school regulation on the same point.
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ulation protects a valid state interest." In this respect, the orderly
maintenance of an atmosphere conducive to the educational goals of a
University has been recognized as a valid state interest.12
On the other hand, while the state is under no duty to make school
buildings available for public meetings, if it elects to do so, it cannot
arbitrarily prevent any member of the public from holding such meetings.
Further, the state cannot make the privilege of holding meetings de-
pendent on conditions that would deprive any members of the public
of their constitutional rights. Thus, a state is without power to impose an
unconstitutional requirement as a condition to granting a privilege, even
though the privilege-here the use of state property-is one subject to
state regulation.' 3
Thus, the question is whether the students' constitutional rights have
been abridged. This determination depends upon the validity of the power
vested in the University administration to deny recognition to an orga-
nization and to deny the use of facilities to organizations which previously
have been denied recognition.
The facts in the instant case indicate that the student organization
was denied recognition by the Acting President. The occupation of the
University building was in direct protest to that denial. There are no
facts in the opinion of the court or the briefs of the parties that indicate
the existence of a standard which was used as a basis for evaluating any
organization as to its fitness or unfitness for recognition.
One of the earliest cases dealing with a similar problem, but in a dif-
ferent factual setting, was Hague v. C..O.'4 That case concerned an
ordinance which forbade assembly in the streets or parks of the city with-
out a permit from the Director of Safety. The director could refuse such
a permit upon his determination that the refusal would prevent riots, dis-
turbances, or disorderly assemblage. The ordinance was held void upon
its face. In the three decades which have elapsed since the Hague deci-
sion was handed down, the United States Supreme Court has established
an impressive array of decisions which hold that a regulation (statute,
ordinance, or administrative rule) subjecting the exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms to a prior restraint of a license, without narrow, ob-
jective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is
unconstitutional. 5
The difference in the decisions was a showing of disorder in the school operations. "The
cases appear to hold that reasonable regulations will be upheld if the actual facts show the
need for such regulations to preserve discipline and order." Lieberman v. Marshall, 236
So.2d 120, 129 (Fla. 1970).
11. Adams v. Sutton, 212 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968); Smith v. Ervin, 64 So.2d 166 (Fla.
1953) ; State ex rel. Nicholas v. Headley, 48 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1950).
12. See Wright, supra note 10.
13. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
15. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) ; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas,
390 U.S. 676 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S.
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The facts in Lieberman also raise the question of whether the stu-
dents' constitutional right of procedural due process, as guaranteed by
the United States Constitution 6 and the Florida Constitution," was
abridged. The requirement of recognition by the University is nothing
more than a requirement that a permit or license be obtained to use
the University facilities. The absence of any ascertainable standard in this
determination is a prima facie violation of due process in permitting a
prior restraint on first amendment freedoms. The reason for this conclu-
sion is that an unlimited and unclear discretionary power is vested in the
granting authority, be it the Acting President as in Lieberman or some
other body representing the administration, in the absence of a narrow,
objective, definite standard to guide the granting authority.
It is conceivable that the analysis of the instant case should conclude
at this point. There are, however, several reasons to continue. First, the
existence of a standard guiding the granting authority has not been dis-
proven. 8 Second, a full analysis of all considerations must be given in the
interest of future situations which may arise in the troublesome area of
administrative regulation of student activity.
Assuming arguendo that there exists a constitutionally acceptable
standard to guide the granting authority, the next consideration would be
the validity of the Acting President's action in denying recognition, with-
out providing a hearing for the student organization. There is no indica-
tion in the case or briefs that the student organization received a hearing
before being denied recognition by the Acting President. The holding in
Carroll9 implies that a hearing must be required before any state official
can make a decision where a "prior restraint" is exercised on a first
amendment freedom. The procedure enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in the obscenity cases," requiring an adversary hearing
313 (1958); Superior Films Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Gelling v.
Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Niemotko
v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1950); Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), 611 (Murphy,
J., dissenting), vacated and previous dissenting opinions adopted per curiam, 319 U.S. 103
(1943) ; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. FLA. CoNsT. DECL. Or RIGHTs art I, § 4.
18. See 1970/71 STUDENT HANDBOOK, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY §§ 7.41(A), 7.42 which
provide that, "[a]n officially recognized organization must not have as a purpose, either in
name or in fact, the advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force or other unlawful
means." The preceding represents the only guideline which the investigation of the writer
has disclosed. Some other standard may exist, but there was no such indication either by
the court in its opinion, or by the parties in their briefs.
19. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
20. Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); A Quantity of Copies of Books
,V. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Kingsly v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957). See also
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (statutory provisions create a constitutionally
acceptable standard for minors where no hearing is required before restraint).
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prior to the restraint of any allegedly obscene material, is analogous to
the restraints discussed herein. A first amendment freedom cannot be
restrained without procedural due process which requires fair notice and
a hearing. If speech is restrained by the state without a hearing to the
party being restrained, then the constitutional rights of that party are
violated."' This violation alone would be sufficient to support the position
of the restrained party, regardless of the reasonableness of the restraint.22
There remains one final consideration which relates to the restrain-
ing order in Lieberman. Was the court's order valid even though it denied
the defendants access to public property? Florida State University is a
state supported University whose physical plant is public property. The
administrators of the University serve in their capacity as public officials.
The defendants, as students, have undeniable first amendment rights
which are exercisable on the University campus.2 In order to restrain
the exercise of first amendment rights in such a situation, the state interest
justifying the restraint should be clearly defined and the conduct which
transgresses that interest should be explicitly proscribed.
Several decisions of the United States Supreme Court have estab-
lished guidelines pertaining to the prohibition of first amendment rights
on public property. Among these guidelines is the determination that the
use of public property to advocate unpopular ideas is not sufficient to
prohibit the activity of the advocate. 4 Nor may activity which stirs
people to anger be validly prohibited. A "belief" by a state officer that
violence will occur is not enough to justify restraining the use of public
property. 6 The expression of grievances by a group without violence
or threat of violence by group members or onlookers is not sufficient to
justify restraint.27 In Edwards v. South Carolina,2" where grievances were
expressed without violence or threat of violence on the grounds of the
state capital, police intervention was held to be an illegal restraint. How-
ever, in Adderley v. Florida,,9 similar activity was held legally prohibited
when a demonstration occurred on a county jailhouse driveway, thereby
inhibiting the normal functioning of the public jail. The activities of the
defendants in the instant case would appear to fall under the rationale
of the Edwards decision. The "belief" of the Acting President that the
disruption created by the confrontation would result in disruption to the
21. But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (justification for restraint without
a hearing is acceptable and permissible where there is a showing of an immediate threat of
violence).
22. The reasonableness of the restraint is a consideration of substantive due process and
separate from procedural matters.
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
24. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
25. Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).
26. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
27. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
28. Id.
29. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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University and would cause "irreparable injury""° appears to fall within
the scope of the decision in Sellers v. Johnson.31 A substantial argument
can also be made that the holding in Adderley should be extended to in-
clude the University buildings. In sum, therefore, the decisions are split
as to whether the restraining order in question, denying access to public
property to the defendants, would be invalid in the absence of an imme-
diate threat of destructive action. 2
The foregoing analysis indicates that the defendants failed to over-
turn the contempt convictions because the proper constitutional ques-
tions were not brought into issue. The allegations that the restraining
order was insufficient and that it violated the defendants' constitutional
rights were stated too broadly. The briefs presented on behalf of the
defendants failed to indicate the specific constitutional questions pre-
sented herein. If these questions had been presented, the results in Lieber-
man should have been different.
Furthermore, the court did not clarify the proper constitutional ques-
tions. To a great extent, the opinion avoided the constitutional questions
which were broadly implied but not specifically raised. The case stands
for the proposition that the restraining order enforced a constitutionally
permissible restraint on a first amendment freedom. This writer disagrees.
Based on the considerations raised in this writing and the law presented,
Lieberman does not provide an adequate precedent for future controver-
sies arising from university regulation of students. The problem of stu-
dent regulation by administrative authorities is current, potent, and
highly volatile. Solutions to the problem are difficult, and Lieberman
is not a step toward an acceptable and constitutional solution.3
ALLEN C. JACOBSON*
30. Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So.2d 120, 124 (Fla. 1970).
31. 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948). See note 25 supra,
and accompanying text.
32. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). This decision represented the cul-
mination in a trend which has modified beyond recognition the clear and present danger
test as the determinant for injunctive relief. The language of the Brandenburg Court indicated
that it is now necessary to show that the activity sought to be enjoined would incite violence;
moreover, the activity would have to be the precursor of immediate destructive action.
33. At the time of this writing, action is pending in the Florida courts to make permanent
the temporary restraining order upheld in the instant case. Subsequent to the submission of
this note, the Second Circuit decided Healy v. James, 40 U.S.L.W. 2071 (2d Cir. July 15,
1971), which dealt directly with the procedural due process requirements mentioned in this
note but not discussed by the court in Lieberman.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Clifford C. Alloway
in the preparation of this note.
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